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TRIBUTE TO FRED E. INBAU
NOTE FROM THE EDITORS
The Journalof CriminalLaw and Criminology is proud to dedicate this issue to Professor Fred E. Inbau, who passed away on
May 28, 1998. Professor Inbau's influence on criminal law was
tremendous, but his influence on the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology was even more significant. He was the Journal's
Editor-in-Chief for many years, and contributed a significant
number of articles and editorials to the Journal. Several of these
articles are reprinted here,' along with a few thoughts from
those scholars who knew him best, and a review of his excellent
book, CriminalInterrogationsand Confessions.
Professor Inbau was unafraid to traverse roads not taken by
many of his colleagues. In many ways, his views of forensics,
criminology, and police practice were ahead of their time. He
was most outspoken in his criticism of the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. This term, the Supreme Court will
revisit the Mirandaholding and the 1968 Congressional attempt
to override that holding2 in United States v. Dickerson, a controversial case in which the Fourth Circuit held that section 3501
supercedes the Mirandaholding.3 Professor Inbau's perspective
on this turn of events will be sorely missed.
We hope you will find that revisiting Professor Inbau's work
intellectually stimulates you as much as it did us while putting
this issue together. He will be greatly missed by the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, but the imprint he left on the
Journalwill not be forgotten.

'In order to preserve the integrity of the original artides, the footnotes deliberately have not
been updated to reflect currently-accepted Bluebook formatting.
2See 18 U.S.C. 3501 (1999).
' See United States v; Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578
(1999).
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TRIBUTE TO FRED INBAU
RONALD J. ALLEN
I was in Italy when I received the news of Fred's death, and I
learned a few days later that I had been asked to pay homage to
his scholarly contributions. Lacking the natural eloquence of
many of my colleagues and the other speakers today, I fear that
I come to you armed only with the simple truth rather than art.
Yet perhaps circumstances conspire to make a virtue out of vice,
for the simple truth best describes and reflects the contributions
of this simple, direct, and insightful scholar. Let me give you a
partial list of some of the simple truths that capture his career.
He saw before anyone else the risks attendant upon the Supreme Court being captured by a narrow ideology uninformed
by a deep knowledge of the reality of law enforcement and its
implications and that focused excessively on the rights of the
accused to the exclusion of all other costs and benefits in the
complex social structure comprising the criminal justice system.
He predicted the explosion in crime rates that came to pass, although it came to pass for many reasons in addition to that of
the Court's work product. He predicted the social unrest that
would result from a declining sense of personal security generated by dramatic increases in criminality, and that it would be
destructive of the legitimacy of any branch of government to fail
to take appropriate action. And he predicted that constitutional adjudication more personally willful than respectful of
traditional modes of constitutional decision making could not
survive, that either the Court would have to abandon the implications of its decisions in what has come to be known as the
procedural revolution, or else it would be forced from the field
by opposing political forces more driven by that innate common
sense typically so instrumental to American political decision
making but sorely lacking in the Supreme Court's constitutional
criminal procedure decisions in the 1960s.

. John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
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I could literally spend hours giving example after example
of the power and significance of these insights, and how current
law in large measure reflects them. I will limit myself to just
one, Fred's favorite. In his introductory remarks in his casebook preceding Miranda v. Arizona, he predicted the case's demise, yet he nonetheless presented it to the students because it
represented the then existing law of the land. I note that the
more recent editors of his casebook have eliminated these introductory remarks, which I fear demonstrates the truism that
the sins of the disciples should not be visited on the master, for,
in one of the great ironies in the field, he has been proven
largely, although to be sure indirectly, right.
Fred knew that neither the actual holding of Miranda nor
the implications of its astonishing rhetoric could long survive,
and that its intellectual foundations would not bear the weight
of any extensions. Fred is often thought to have been proven
wrong by the failure of the Court to explicitly overrule Miranda,
but in fact, it is Fred, not his high powered intellectual opponents, such as Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan, who
has actually won the day. Not, by the way, that Fred would ever
think in terms of winning or losing; he never personalized any
of his professional life, so far as I can tell, but I digress. Let me
finish with Miranda first. Immediately following the case, the
Supreme Court under the immense political pressure that Fred
anticipated would arise, began its retreat-pressure whose bedrock, by the way, was common sense, a quality Fred possessed in
great abundance and in indirect proportion to his academic
opponents. In any event, the Court refused to extend the case
retroactively; it held it created only prophylactic rules, not constitutional commands; the rules could be flexibly administered;
waiver could occur simply and directly without the need of a
well defined script; the rule did not apply at all to on the scene
questioning or when a serious question of public safety was at
stake. And so on. The Court never even came close to taking
the next logical step quite evident in Miranda itself and urged
on it by its academic supporters of forbidding all confessions resulting from police interrogation. We have now reached the
point, in fact, where the police have largely stopped objecting to
Miranda. They have adapted to it, and the Court has adapted its
rules to the police. It undoubtedly still comes with a price, but
the price is bearable, and its overruling might possibly be worse
than the disease.
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Now, let me tell you another great irony, one that again
shows the depth of insight possessed by this simple, direct man.
Fred once agreed with me that he doubted Mirandashould be
explicitly overruled. He, like me, feared that it would be taken
as a symbol by the police that, so to speak, all bets were off, and
a return to the days of the third degree was acceptable. Well,
you might be wondering, for all the good sense of that concern,
where is the irony? It lies here. Fred has often been vilified by
his opponents in the academy as though he were in favor of
anything that forced words out of a suspect's mouth. The truth
of the matter is that Fred was one of a handful of individuals
most responsible for the civilizing and professionalization of the
police. Unlike his single minded critics who see only the costs
imposed by the police and who value only abstract intellectualization, which by the way is why they have become largely irrelevant and Fred's views more and more transcendent, Fred saw
the whole picture, and he saw it as it really was, not how some
theory predicted it should be. When he first looked at the system in the earliest years of his career-and here is the ironywhat he saw was police forces out of control, and he undertook
to civilize them. You have heard of his contributions to the
science of forensics, but his contributions far exceeded those.
Whenever he instructed the police, and remember, that was all
the time, he harped on one point over and over again-you
cannot do anything that would make an innocent person
confess. Violence and threats of violence were simply out of the
question. Cruelty designed to break the will, whether physical
or mental, could not be employed. Could the police exploit the
weaknesses of suspects, if doing so would lead to the solving of
serious crime? Yes, of course, he would reply, this is not a game
we are playing. People are actually hurting other people, and
we must do whatever we can within the bounds of civilization to
maintain peace and security.
Some have rebuked Fred for raising lies and deception to
constitutional status. But never if there was a risk of generating
an erroneous confession. And when you step back from the all
too often arid ratiocinations of Law Professor Land and the New
York Times, for that matter, which is to be preferred, taking advantage of the thankfully often present weaknesses of those accused of serious crimes in a way that will not lead to wrongful
convictions or freeing, without punishment, those who commit
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such acts? When discussing such a question, I can almost hear
Fred say:
Yes, I am sure that it is bad thing to deceive anyone, but maybe
some things are worse. Take Brewer v. Williams as an example. Pamela
Powers was abducted in Des Moines, Iowa, by Robert Williams. A day or
so later, Williams turned himself in to the police in Davenport, Iowa, approximately a three hour drive from Des Moines. As Williams was being
driven by the police back to Des Moines, a snow storm started up. The
police had some hopes that Pamela was still alive, and were fairly certain
that she was somewhere between Des Moines and Davenport. In the
hope of finding her before she died, one of the officers transporting Williams, knowing that he some peculiar religious beliefs, asked Williams to
reflect that the snowstorm covering Pamela's body would make it impossible to give her a Christian burial. After some reflection, Williams took
the police to the site where he had left her body.

Now, Fred would say, what should the police have done?
Just how important is it that they deliberately manipulated a
known weakness of Robert Williams? And perhaps most tellingly of all, what would you want done if you were Mr. or Mrs.
Powers?
But, his opponents would argue, really Fred, the matter is a
bit more complicated than you make out. Police interrogation
is inherently compelling, and compulsion is at the heart of the
fifth amendment's guarantee that a person has a right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination. "And how does that right
weigh in the balance with the need to enforce the criminal law?"
Fred would reply. Well, you really cannot balance such things,
his opponents would respond, for after all it is a Constitution we
are expounding. "Well, yes," would reply Fred, "and in my view
the Constitution was explicitly dedicated to such matters as insuring domestic tranquility and promoting the general Welfare,
and frankly I don't see anything in here," as he metaphorically
thumbed his Constitution, "about the document being dedicated solely to protecting the rights of the accused. Surely that's
important, but it can hardly be the only criterion. Convicting
guilty people, and protecting innocent ones, must matter also."
Well, yes, that's true, comes the response, but the fifth
amendment does forbid coercion, and all we're trying to do is
implement that command. Now, note Fred's response to this. I
linger on it because it so well represents the power of his intellect presented in a simple and direct way. "How, exactly," he
would ask, "do the Miranda rules eliminate coercion? Isn't
merely being arrested coercive? Isn't being charged with a serious crime coercive? Isn't it coercive to be asked questions by
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the police whether you're arrested or not?" The answers to all
these questions are obviously, yes, they are coercive, and yet they
are all allowed. Without ever invoking the high theoretical apparatus of modem philosophy, Fred had put his finger right on
the core issue. Without a means of sorting out coercive from
non-coercive settings, the Miranda rules made no sense. And
those means don't exist.
But, now in a fit of exasperation, his opponents would say
that leaves us with no rule at all, which is worse than the intellectual bankruptcy of Miranda. Quite wrong, said Fred. The
right rule, the rule that makes sense and that optimizes the
various competing interests, is that the police cannot do anything likely to lead an innocent person to confess. It is that
simple. It is that profound. Throughout the decades, Fred's intellectual opponents have never devised an answer to this point.
The reason is because he was right and they were wrong, and as
a not very surprising consequence, the law today is much more
sympathetic to Fred's views than those of his opponents. Sometimes the most powerful, and correct, ideas come without lots of
intellectual baggage. Fred's career is an embodiment of that
point.
I could give many more analogous examples of the deep
significance of Fred's work to the modem landscape of criminal
justice-for example, Fred filed an amicus brief in Brewer v. Williams that was joined by the attorneys general of 21 states. Teny
v. Ohio largely brought the procedural revolution to a close, and
again a brief filed by Fred was apparently critical to the outcome. But time is short and one other point of a different cast
deserves attention-the manner in which Fred went about his
task. As many of you know, Fred was the object of serious attacks by his less well mannered colleagues in the professorate.
He was the embodiment and central figure of what they conceived of as the opposition. Yet, for all the provocation that he
had, to my knowledge he never- once acted out of personal anger or spoke an uncivil word. He knew that we were all in this
together and that disagreement did not mean venality. In the
early days of the creation of the field of constitutional criminal
procedure, he was in fact its central figure. It was Fred choosing
who to invite to conferences and the like, and it was Fred who
always insisted that his opponents be given an equal opportunity
to speak. He set the standard not only by the quality of his work
but by its civility. One last example. As I mentioned, Yale Ka-
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misar was Fred's chief intellectual opponent, yet Fred time and
time again gave Professor Kamisar the opportunity to present
his views at important conferences and urged the police and
prosecutors present to listen to them. They were, and I speak
here from intimate personal knowledge, the best of friends.
In all respects, Fred's was a life well lived, and all of us here
are honored by our association with him.
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THOUGHTS ABOUT FRED E. INBAU
MARVIN E. ASPEN*
As was the case with so many of his students, Fred Inbau was
an integral part of my professional life. He was my teacherand was the first to kindle my interest in criminal law and the
criminal justice system. He was my mentor and-after law
school and a short term in the military-recommended me for
my firstjob as a lawyer.
He was my colleague-both as a professor of law and as a
co-author. Fred wrote 18 legal texts. I co-authored three. I was
thrilled when Fred first asked me to be his co-author. At the
time I suspected it was not without design that Fred usually
worked with a co-author; I expected to do 90% of the work and
to receive 10% of the royalties. To be truthful, as a young lawyer, I would have done all of the work without pay just to be
listed as Fred's co-author. But typical of Fred's work ethic and
generosity, he did more than his share of the work, and I received more than a fair percentage of the royalties.
Fred became a life long friend. When we lunched together
two weeks before his death, notwithstanding some of the minor
physical glitches that inevitably visit with age, Fred, as always,
was upbeat. He spoke with enthusiasm of the current revisions
of his legal books and the novel he had been working on for
several years. He told me again the story of how 60 years ago,
he bid goodbye to his friend and colleague John Henry Wigmore and watched as Wigmore entered the loop taxi that was to
crash and take Wigmore's life and how proud he was to be the
John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law Emeritus. As always, he
asked about my wife and children.
Fred was a part of a golden age at Northwestern law school.
His colleagues were among the giants of legal academia of the
times: Wigmore, Green, Havighurst, Wirtz, Nathanson, Allen,
McChesney, Pedrik, Schaefer to name but a few. But Fred stood
out to so many of his students, not only because he was perhaps
. Chief'Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.
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the lonely conservative in a typical 1950s liberal law school faculty but because-whether or not you agreed with all of his tenets-his personal qualities of intellectual integrity and
courage-and the passion of convictions-were genuine and
special.
Fred was an outspoken conservative on many criminal constitutional issues (during an era when legal thinking was dominated by a liberal majoritarian view). Because of his views, Fred
was affectionately referred to by my classmates as "Freddy the
Cop." Fred's student code name was reinforced and legendized
when Fred's actions matched his student image during an incident at the law school. It seems that there was a series of minor
thefts from faculty offices at the law school. One evening Fred
sat alone in his office with the lights out, apparently staking out
the suspect. Sure enough Fred's office door opened. Fred
chased the offender through the law school and with the help
of a burly ex-marine law student, apprehended and subdued
him and made a text book citizen's arrest. The nomenclature
"Freddy the Cop" was here to stay.
But Fred-was no dogmatic conservative. The Fred Inbau
known by those who took the time to do so often was at odds
with his public persona. In many respects Fred's views were
trend-setting and even quite liberal.
Before Fred founded and administered the Northwestern
Short Course for Prosecutors in 1936, continuing legal education had yet to become a staple of every major law school program. Fred's Short Course was the first national continuing
legal education program for prosecutors. In 1957, he added the
Fred
Northwestern Short Course for Defense Attorneys.
founded the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, a private not-for-profit organization, espousing many of the now
trendy victims rights causes.
Law schools of the 1940s and 1950s were rigid in their curricula. Students were for the most part taught theoretically in a
limited number of traditional law school subjects. Although it is
now popular to teach interdisciplinary subjects in law school,
Fred combined non legal subjects-criminology and police science-in his criminal law curriculum, at a time when legal purism was the rule.
His law enforcement orientation aside, Fred was extremely
wary of eye witness identification. One lasting law school memory is the annual staged "incident" during Fred's freshman
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criminal law class. For example, a stranger might enter the
classroom, perhaps, carrying a cap pistol or a knife, cause a disruption and quickly flee the classroom. All of this would take
place in a matter of seconds. The class reaction would invariably be one of stunned silence. Then Fred would ask each of us
to write a written description of the incident and of the provocateur. Invariably, the man would be described as anywhere
from 20 to 40 years of age, 150 to 250 pounds, and 5'6" to 6'2".
Half the class would have him wearing glasses. Some would describe him with a moustache. The liberal lesson taught by this
conservative law professor was that you should be wary of basing
a prosecution on single eyewitness identification alone.
Fred remained a man for all seasons. His views did not
change with prevailing political winds. What he passionately believed in at the time of the Warren Court, he still advocated
when later some of his teachings were legitimized by the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts. Fred always respected opposing views.
Indeed, during his last years of teaching, his closest faculty colleague was probably the late and beloved Jim Haddad whose
take on many constitutional issues were opposite to his own.
Fred was puzzled when others were less tolerant. He was almost
naive in his dismay and disappointment when the dialogue of
disagreement became disagreeable and personal.
Fred has left the greatest legacy of any teacher. His work
will live on in the accomplishments of the students whom he inspired and who respected him: the governors, legislators,
judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, law school
deans and professors, and other leaders of our professionmany of whom are with us today.
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MEMORIES OF PROFESSOR FRED E. INBAU
JOHN F. KEENAN'
It is with great honor that I join the Editors of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology in remembering the late Fred E.
Inbau.
Professor Fred Inbau was a giant in the field of criminal law
who left a legacy that will be remembered well into the next millennium. He was a dear friend with whom I had the pleasure of
visiting whenever I came from New York to Chicago.
It was in the summer of 1968 when I first met Professor Inbau at the Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys at Northwestern University Law School. Fred had contacted the New York
District Attorney, Frank S. Hogan, and asked him to recommend someone from his office to participate on the panel to
teach trial techniques to prosecutors. I was fortunate to be chosen for the Short Course faculty and continued to participate
each year until Fred retired from the Law School faculty in
1§77. For that ten years and after his retirement, I would see
Professor Inbau every summer and came to appreciate his fine
mind, his keen wit, and his self-effacing modesty. A native of
New Orleans, he possessed a combination of southern charm
and mid-western practicality.
Fred believed that trial lawyers should never talk down to
jurors and, each year at the Short Course, he would tell the attending prosecutors the following story which pointed-up in
graphic terms the folly of demeaning jurors. Professor Inbau
would start the trial techniques panel by saying:
It seems that there was a defense lawyer whose client was charged
with a homicide. The defendant had been provoked by a verbal insult
from the deceased. The deceased had called the defendant, who was
carrot-topped, a "red-headed son-of-a-bitch." This so infuriated the defendant that he stabbed the deceased to death. In his summation, the
defense lawyer looked at the jury and said to Juror number 1, who wore
heavy and thick eyeglasses, "How would you like to be called a four-eyed
son-of-a-bitch?" and then the lawyer looked at Juror number 5, who was
bald, and inquired "How would you feel if you were called a bald-headed
"SeniorJudge, United States District Court for the Southern District of NewYork.

1281

1282

JOHNF. KEENAN

[Vol. 89

son-of-a-bitch?" Then gazing intently at the remaining ten the apocryphal lawyer asked "And as for the rest of you, how would you like to be
called the various kinds of sons-of-bitches you are?"

Some might have found the story offensive, but all who
heard it left the Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys with
one practical admonition which they would never forget"DON'T TALK DOWN TO JURORS." Fred made sure his
attendees learned that important lesson of trial lawyering.
Professor Inbau began the Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys in 1936 and it continues with great success even after his
passing. In devising the Course, he created a program of continuing legal education for prosecutors from all over the United
States who, for one week each summer, came to the great city of
Chicago where they received formal training in areas of forensics and the art of persuasion which they never would have
learned in their individual offices. The concept of a course just
for prosecutors was decades ahead of its time and it gave those
young men and women who attended the opportunity to exchange ideas and approaches to the trial of a case. All who attended benefited from the richness of the experience and the
professionalism of Fred and his lecturers.
Not only was Professor Inbau an outstanding scholar, he was
a prolific writer. His "Criminal Interrogation and Confessions,"
written with John E. Reid, has been referred to by the New York
Times as "the undisputed bible of police interrogation since its
initial publication in 1962."
More than being a renowned professor and an accomplished author, Fred was a dedicated family man, a warm and
thoughtful human being and a supporting and caring friend.
He had a great love for Northwestern University Law School
and his contributions to it will long be remembered and appreciated.

0091-4169/99/8904-1283
THE JOURNALOF CRIMINALLAW& CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright 0 1999 by Northwestern University, School of Law

Vol. 89, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

FRED INBAU: THE NATION'S SENIOR
POLICE LEGAL ADVISOR
WAYNE W. SCHMIDT
For many years, Fred Inbau gave up much of his summer to
prepare for and host two intensive programs. One was for
prosecuting attorneys; the other was for defense counsel. But
Fred realized that even an effective prosecutor could not correct
an "illegal" search or preserve a tainted confession.
During the activist years of the "Warren Court," Fred
thought that law enforcement officers would be better equipped
to perform their duties if they had access to an in-house lawyer,
to guide them through the pitfalls of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
Fred wanted to help the police make their charges stick in
court. He approached the Ford Foundation, which had a reputation for funding liberal causes. One of his contacts at the
Foundation was a man who later would become the executive
director of the United Negro College Fund. That man understood the importance of providing the police with timely and
competent legal advice, because he wanted to prevent police
abuses. It was a marriage of ideals-the protection of constitutional rights and the increase of convictions that could withstand appellate review. Thus began the Police Legal Advisor
Program of Northwestern University's Graduate School of Law.
With his young associate, James R. Thompson, they started
searching for young lawyers who were willing to come to Chicago for a year and pursue an LL.M. at Northwestern, while
working part-time with the Chicago Police, as a legal intern.
Fred also embarked on the task of encouraging police
chiefs and sheriffs to employ these attorneys, after they completed their on-thejob training and post-graduate education.
His efforts were later noticed by the Justice Department, and its
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration assisted by funding

'Executive Director, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.
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dozens of law enforcement agencies that wanted to employ a legal advisor.
In 1966, Fred hosted the first annual conference of police
legal advisors. Beginning in 1971, the annual conference sponsorship was assumed by the International Association of Chiefs
of Police (IACP). The 33rd annual conference (in October
1998) was attended by many of the more than 160 members of
the IACP Legal Section.
Although the Ford Foundation funding ended in 1971, intensive training for police attorneys continues at the FBI Academy's annual National Law Institute.
Two of the first graduates of that program still actively serve
as police legal advisors; I am one of them. I had the privilege of
later serving as director of the law school's Police Legal Advisor
Program, and with Fred's guidance and encouragement, starting in-house legal services, or providing training for new legal
advisors, in more than 70 law enforcement agencies, that employed in excess of 100,000 police officers.
Fred Inbau's vision to train and employ police legal advisors
has left an indelible imprint on criminal justice in America. His
name will not be known to the thousands of victims of crime,
who were assisted by officers with access to in-house counsel.
His name will not be known to the innocent, who were not arrested or prosecuted, because police officers had a better understanding of criminal law and procedure. His name will not
be known to the guilty, who lost their appeals because investigating officers did not violate their constitutional rights. Nor
will his name be known to the many thousands of Americans
who did not become victims of violent crime, because the perpetrator was already in custody, or had been rehabilitated.
Fred Inbau's influence will last long beyond the three decades after he had the foresight to spawn the police legal advisor
concept.
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FRED INBAU: A COMMENT ON HIS WORK
AND HIS CHARACTER
JAMES B. ZAGEL"
In 1933, shortly after his law school graduation yet before
his admission to the bar, Fred Inbau wrote an article with Newman Baker, a professor at the Northwestern University School of
Law. The two men wrote of the lack of attention paid to promising techniques for the scientific detection of crime: the develThey
opment of scientific proof of guilt or innocence.
sense
common
on
the
reliance
prevailing
remarked upon the
and experience of police officers; the reasoning or intuition of
these officers was then thought to be the key to the apprehension of criminals, and no one asked too many questions about
the methods of reasoning. In the end, they wrote:
Every step in the promotion of scientific crime detection is a step
toward the abolition of the cruel and ineffective methods of establishing
criminal identity such as the "third degree," and also a step toward the
realization of a criminal trial unhampered by technical procedure and
unreliable evidence. The use of brutality by the police in securing confessions, the reception of flimsy evidence as to identity, and the ineffectiveness of circumstantial evidence may be curtailed by more reliance
upon scientific data and less reliance upon individual "reasoning.

Fred Inbau was a Raymond Fellow in Criminal Law at the
Northwestern University School of Law when the article saw the
light of day. In due course, he became an expert in scientific
evidence, a practicing lawyer, a professor of law, then the first
occupant of the John Henry Wigmore chair in law, and finally
emeritus professor. In time, he became very well known; indeed, he became almost incalculably influential in his field. To
his end, he remained faithful to the important principles he
and Baker outlined in 1933.

*United States DistrictJudge, Northern District of Illinois and co-author with Fred E. Inbau
(and others) of several editions of CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION and CASES AND
COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
' Newman F. Baker & Fred E. Inbau, The Sientfic Detetion of C0ime 17 MINN. L. REV. 602
(1933).
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What he believed in 1933 came to be believed by all the best
minds in his field. As the century proceeded, the basic principles did not change, but some of the definitions did. What
some thought was technical, others came to think of as substantive. What constituted brutality in securing confessions became
a subject of debate. Even the systemic values of preserving individual rights and the dignity of government, which might trump
the use of reliable, non-brutal methods, became controversial in
the field of criminal justice. Virtually all of Fred Inbau's professional life, from about 1943 (when McNabb v. United States was
decided) 2 until his death, was enmeshed in the debate between
those who spoke as though the primary (but not the sole) role
of the criminal justice system was the reification, or, at least, the
reflection, of broad social values and symbols3 and those who
role was to condemn the
thought its primary (but not the sole)
4
innocent.
the
exonerate
and
guilty
For more than a half-century, Fred Inbau explored criminal
justice as a scholar. He did not much care for polemics. He was
often the target of polemics, but I cannot recall Fred Inbau ever
attacking the character or politics of anyone who disagreed with
him. He would say they were wrong or mistaken, he would not
call them names. And I write here of his private conversations
when even the most reserved of persons often let loose the invective that so often mars public debate. Intellectual opponents
often become "fascists," "communists," "bigots," "oppressors,"
"toadys," "liars," "sexists"; perhaps this works in political debate
(or in high level philosophical debate in France) 5; it is worse
than useless in trying to discover a good solution to any social issue on which reasonable persons might disagree.
I do not mean to say that Fred Inbau did not think badly of
some people. He served in a quasijudicial capacity on the Illi2318

U.S. 332 (1943).

'SeeUnited States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 355,356 (1974) (BrennanJ., dissenting) ("[U]nless
we are to shut our eyes to the evidence that crosses our desks every day, we must concede that
official lawlessness has not abated since creation of the exclusionary rule.").
"See Fred E. Inbau, The Perversion of Science in Criminaland Personnel Investigations, 43J. cRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & P.S. 128 (1952) (criticizing doctors and forensic experts for acceding to police demands to pump the stomach of an unwilling suspect or otherwise to invade the body of an
un-consenting individual to gain evidence).
'For the sake of correctness, I note that I write here with irony. I do not mean to accuse all
academic philosophers in France of using low invective. I speak only of the one, whom I do not
name, whom I heard refer to the serious work of a 20th century English philosopher as "merde."
That single word was all that he had to say on the subject.
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nois State Police Merit Board and made judgments about the
worth and integrity of police officers and, sometimes, of hearing
officers. What Fred Inbau understood is that dispassion is a virtue if one is searching for the truth. Often the truth is hard to
see and strong emotions usually cloud vision. Even when he
thought his opponents were fools, he thought it worth the effort
to try to persuade them of his position. He did not inhabit a
world that so many lawyers do, a world where the only goal is to
win the argument, for winning's sake alone.
While Fred's emphasis was not on winning arguments, he
knew that he was a scholar in the law. You can see what this
means if you look at the three essays published together in 1965
for The Magna Carta Commission of Virginia under the title
"Criminal justice in Our Time."6
One essay written by Thurman Arnold recounted three
cases in which either he or his partner (Abe Fortas) had served
as counsel.7 Judge Arnold closed in this way:
The tremendously important result of the moral values implicit in
the Durham, Pound and Gideon cases... is that these moving dramas on
the courtroom stage tend to create a compassionate society. Only a
compassionate society can take the measures which will solve the probcities.8
lem of crime and violence in the slums of our great

I doubt thatJudge Arnold would write the same words today
after the nation's experience with the moving dramas on the
courtroom stage brought to us live and in color on television.
But it is not the merit of his argument that I wish to address. I
simply note that it is the argument of a cultural anthropologist/semiotician/criminologist.
Another essay written by Yale Kamisar noted the difference
in constitutional protections afforded to the defendant at trial
in the "mansion" of justice, and those afforded to the criminal
suspect at the police station in the "gatehouse" ofjustice, where
he is "subjected to 'interrogation tactics and techniques most
appropriate for the occasion. ' ' 9 In the latter, Kamisar wrote,
"ideals are checked at the door, 'realities' faced, and the pres' CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OUR TIME (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).

' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); United States v. Ezra Pound (D.D.C. 1958).
' Thurman Arnold, The CriminalTrial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in CRIMINALJUSTICE IN
OURTIME, supranote 6, at 161.
'Yale Kamisar, EqualJustice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American CriminalProcedure, in
CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OUR TIME, supra note 6, at 20 (quoting FRED E. INBAu &JOHN E. REID,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFEsSIONs 20 (1st ed. 1962)).
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tige of law enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves the 'gatehouse' and enters the 'mansion' . . . the enemy is repersonal-

ized, even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony
in honor of individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated." 10 One can agree with this or reject it, but it is at bottom
an argument of a philosopher of ethics and politics. The passage, indeed much of the article, would fit right in with a collection of philosophers from Bacon to Mill.
Fred Inbau began his essay as follows:
A law-abiding citizen is on his way home at night when an unseen
assailant hits him over the head, rendering him unconscious because of
a fractured skull. His wallet containing $50 is taken from him, and his
assailant flees into the darkness. No one witnesses this occurrence; only
the victim's condition, the missing wallet, and perhaps the sound of
running footsteps heard by a nearby resident reveal what occurred. That
same night a young woman is forced into an alley and raped. She cannot describe her assailant to the police except in a vague and general
way; she tells the police she cannot identify him; all she can say is that he
was tall, white, and that he wore a light-colored jacket, that she scratched
his face, and that she herself bled as a result of the attack. In another
similar case the victim is killed and there are no witnesses known to the
11
police.
By what means can these cases be solved?

The answer to this question was determined (in the preDNA testing days and, often, even now) by means of police interrogation. In turn, Fred Inbau discussed stop and frisk practices, the exclusionary rule and wiretapping; each time he used
a case example. Eventually, he concluded that courts ought not
try by indirection to force police to behave properly by releasing
obviously guilty criminals. Rather, he thought the answer was
direct action to improve police quality, efficiency and respect
for individual civil liberties by proper selection of personnel,
training, non-political promotion, competent supervision, and
adequate compensation.12 One could accept or reject this view,
but it arose from his legal analysis of the problem at issue. Fred
Inbau analyzed cases, reasoned from cases, drew inferences
from the study of cases. He remained committed to the methods of law and lawyers in which he was trained and practiced.
You might answer Thurman Arnold with a quote from Clifford
10Id.
" Fred E. Inbau, Law Enforcemen4 The Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN OUR TIME, supra note 6, at 99.
"Id. at 134-35.
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Geertz or Umberto Eco. You might answer Yale Kamisar with a
quote from Hobbes or Bentham. You can answer Fred Inbau
only with other cases, with counter-examples. This is, in my
view, one of his great virtues.
Fred Inbau thought the United States Supreme Court had
made errors in its confession jurisprudence. One of the errors
was in its judgment, implicit in Miranda v. Arizona,' that the
practical necessity for confessions to solve criminal cases was not
as great, anywhere near as great, as Fred Inbau knew it to be. In
On Lee v. United States, the Supreme Court could quote the famous dictum that "it is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the
shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go
about in the sun hunting up evidence,",4 because it was filled
with judges who had rarely spent anytime themselves in the hot
sun looking for evidence that did not and could not exist. Fred
also knew that this was a fake dichotomy and that facts are
blurred in the service of dry wit, as one does not need to torture
in order to interrogate. Nevertheless, this was an error that he
could understand. What he did not understand was the attempt of the Court and its defenders to portray the costs of the
decision in Miranda as relatively slight. Fred Inbau knew that,
because of Miranda, many guilty persons would go unpunished
and some of those would commit more crimes. One can argue
that the percentage of such cases is very small compared to the
universe of criminal investigations but it is difficult to argue that
the absolute number of cases is small or that the crimes they involve are trivial.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's carelessness about the basis
and effects of its decisions had been profoundly distressing to
Fred Inbau for many years. In 1948, he had established that the
legislative and factual basis for the decision in McNabb v. United
States was deeply flawed and yet the Court seemed to ignore
these truths.16 Fred Inbau was committed to the truth. He
could have comprehended and respected (if not agreed with)
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1
STEPHEN, A HISTORYOFTHE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND n. 442 (1803)).

" One of the great ironies in Miranda is that the majority in the Supreme Court implicitly
criticized Fred Inbau's book on interrogation techniques, see 384 U.S. at 1614 n. 9, despite its
clear instruction to police to "investigate before you interrogate." FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFFSSIONS 10 (1st ed. 1962).
" See Fred's dose analysis of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), in Fred E. Inbau,
The ConfessionDilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442 (1948).
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an opinion that said, "We realize that some criminals will go
free and even more persons may be victimized by those we free,
but the value to society of this control on police is worth the
price some of us must pay for our limitation on the police." Indeed, this is one explicit rationale of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases and a rationale that
he accepted.
Fred Inbau thought that the truth was the most important
thing. He believed in exonerating the innocent, in convicting
the guilty, and in honest, realistic reasons for judicial opinion. I
never heard him criticize the constitutionalization of the right
to a fair eyewitness identification procedure, although he did
wonder how the Supreme Court could say the doctrine was a
recognized ground of attack when only one federal court in one
case had adopted it. 17 In the political world there are plenty of

people who are willing to suppress the truth if the truth would
embarrass some distinguished person or some worthy cause.
The French government's unwillingness swiftly to exonerate
Dreyfus was probably rooted less in the belief that Dreyfus was
guilty and more in the desire not to subject the military establishment to political loss of face. The defense of Stalinism in
the West was grounded less in approval of his barbarous acts
and more in the fear that any admission of wrongdoing would
damage the sacred cause of the proletariat. Fred Inbau was a
man who wanted the truth out, no matter which way it would
cut. If he had been in the French right wing, he would still have
stood up for Dreyfus. If he had been the leader of the French
communist party, he would still have condemned the show trials.
Before his death, Fred Inbau had seen two developments of
significance. Those who do not know Fred well would be wrong
about which of the two pleased him.
The first was the apparent public approval of police methods of interrogation that are far tougher than most of us would
have thought defensible just a few years ago. I have in mind
NYPD Blue (but it is not the only example) in which police officers portrayed as heroes regularly use violence or the threat of
violence to secure confessions. This television show, and others
like it, would not be as popular as it is absent public approval of
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.

17

1966)).
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the police methods it portrays. And, indeed, it also portrays the
use of psychological techniques, which Fred Inbau advocated.
Nonetheless, Fred found nothing admirable about the portrayal
of police violence as justifiable or worthy, and he was not
pleased by the public acceptance of it. Fred Inbau was not propolice, he was pro-truth, and he knew that violence leads to false
confessions.
The second was the new emphasis on looking at interrogation practices in light of their likelihood of inducing false confessions. There is a debate now as never before about whether
police secure false confessions, how often and why, and what to
do about it. Some of the writers identify Fred Inbau's own
techniques as the culprit in some false confession cases.' Fred
Inbau was pleased with this debate and would have been more
pleased if he could have seen it develop. This is so for two reasons. First, he knew that if the goal of the process is to eliminate the techniques that produce falsehood, then an inevitable
consequence of the process will be to approve the techniques
that produce truth. So, the debate is finally being conducted in
the way Fred Inbau always thought it should be conducted.
Second, no one would have been more willing to listen to evidence that his own techniques were flawed. It was not rhetoric,
it was bedrock morality that led Fred Inbau to say that the
guideline for all confession practice is: "Is what I am about to do
or say apt to make an innocent person confess?"' 9

" CompareRichard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confeasions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscariagesof Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogations,88 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) with Paul G. Cassell, Protectingthe Innocentfrom False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-AndFrom Miranda, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998).
" FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, & JOSEPH P. BucKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS 217 (3rd ed. 1986).
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